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McCain Camp Mum on Iraq Timeline (Updated)

Matthew DeLong — Fri, 22 Aug 2008 21:19:24 GMT

Up at his ranch near Sedona, Sen. John McCain must be fuming. After everything he's done for President George W. Bush's campaign efforts -- the endorsement through clenched teeth after the bruising 20000 primary, stumping in 2004, etc. -- Bush couldn't even do McCain the simple courtesy of not completely undermining the Arizona senator's entire Iraq policy as he makes his bid for the presidency.

Now that the Bush administration appears to be on the verge of agreeing to a timeline (or is it a timetable? a time horizon?) for the withdrawal of American troops from Iraq by 2011, the presumed GOP nominee is in a pretty tight spot. On the campaign trail, McCain frequently disparages any notion of a timeline for withdrawal, preferring instead to put his faith in the judgment of Gen. David Petraeus -- whom McCain referred to as "one of the great military leaders in American history" last weekend at the Saddleback Church forum -- to bring the troops home as developments on the ground permit.

Sen. Barack Obama, on the other hand, has had his 16-month timetable essentially endorsed by Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki -- who is currently negotiating the new timeline with the Bush administration. The administration subsequently shifted its position from being adamantly against anything remotely resembling a timetable for troop withdrawal and agreed to a "time horizon," the difference being largely semantic.

Of course, the agreement being negotiated reportedly provides for a change to the timeline if security deteriorates in the future, so it's not totally artificial. But now that McCain finds himself all alone on one side -- with objective reality, the Iraqi and American governments, and perhaps most important for him, his Democratic opponent standing together on the other -- what is he to do? Flip-flop? Hold fast to an increasingly irrelevant position?

Not surprisingly, the McCain campaign has yet to make a statement on the new developments -- it may be waiting to see the final result. But the prospect of reformulating its position on the central issue of its campaign, with a little more than two months remaining until the general election, must have some folks in Sedona and Arlington a bit worried.

UPDATE: At 8:07 EDT Sen John McCain released the following statement, doing its best to spin the days events favorably -- i.e. the success of the surge allowed these discussions in the first place, and this is fundamentally a "conditions-based agreement" that is really what McCain has been arguing for the whole time.

"I am pleased that, following the surge strategy led by General David Petraeus and our brave men and women in uniform, security in Iraq has improved to the point at which we can responsibly talk with our Iraqi allies about U.S. troop withdrawals. Because of the hard-won success of this strategy, the Iraqi security forces are able to take on ever greater responsibility for security in their country. We should not forget that this is possible only because of the surge -- a strategy many predicted would fail and that some cannot, even today, recognize as a stunning success.

"While negotiations with the Iraqi government are ongoing, reports indicate that all dates included in the draft security agreement are aspirational goals, based on conditions on the ground. Conditions-based withdrawals of U.S. troops are the precise opposite course of that advocated by Senator Obama. Senator Obama seeks to withdraw all U.S. combat forces regardless of the consequences for Iraq or for American national security, and in disregard of our commanders' best counsel. Had we followed his course, Iraq could have easily descended into chaos and America would have suffered a catastrophic defeat. Instead, we are today negotiating a conditions-based agreement that will enable us to withdraw troops in victory and with honor."

Permanent Bases Again?

Spencer Ackerman — Fri, 22 Aug 2008 14:28:57 GMT

Seriously, I thought this was done. The New York Times has this errant mention, though:

Even if the goal of withdrawing combat troops by 2011 is realized, the accord does leave open the possibility that American military trainers and support forces could remain in Iraq after that time. It is unclear whether the accord provides for semipermanent military bases in the country, and what role the United States would play in providing air and naval support for Iraq.

As a wise old owl once said: O RLY?

Withdrawal/Sons Of Iraq Quid Pro Quo?

Spencer Ackerman — Fri, 22 Aug 2008 13:37:57 GMT

My friend Dr. iRack surveys the timetable for U.S. withdrawal and notices a pretty important convergence: June 2009. By that point, the U.S. is supposed to be both out of Iraqi cities and, say the Doctor's sources, relinquished the Sons of Iraq program -- much hated by the Shiite government -- over to the Iraqis. What's that mean? Doctor:

This means the Maliki government will be free to employ them if they so desire or, more likely, fire them, detain them, or use all that biometric and biographical information we've collected to do whatever else they see fit with them. Given the fact that Maliki and his allies hate these guys and, according to a recent interview with General Petraeus, the Iraqi government is purposefully slowing the integration process down, it is unlikely that Maliki and his buddies will be generous once they are in complete control of the program. And if recent behavior in Diyala and the newly reported crack down on SoIs in Abu Ghraib are any indication, things could get ugly.

Again, this all goes back to the "assertiveness" of Maliki. If what Dr. iRack writes is borne out, Maliki believes he really can take on all comers and win. The Sons of Iraq are not going to take their extirpation lying down.

U.S. Out Of Iraqi Cities In June 2009, (Mostly) Out Of Iraq in 2011, Will Commute To Work

Spencer Ackerman — Fri, 22 Aug 2008 12:56:36 GMT

The New York Times reports that the draft U.S.-Iraq deal has U.S. troops pulling out of Iraqi "cities and villages" by June 2009 and combat forces out by 2011. As predicted, the Bush administration is insisting that these timetables are not in fact timetables. Sayeth Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice:

"We have always said that the roles, missions and size of the American forces here, the coalition forces, was based on the conditions on the ground and what is needed."

And here, the operative "condition on the ground" is Nouri al-Maliki's desire to retain power, and his mechanism for doing so is to insist on a staggered U.S. withdrawal to undercut his nationalistic rivals. So there's your consistency right there. In truth, this is a capitulation to reality, the collapse of the main Iraq argument made by George Bush in his second term: timetables for withdrawal will kill you and your grandmother. For liberals, that's two for the price of one!

But here's a serious question raised by the out-of-the-cities move. How does that scramble Gen. Ray Odierno's war planning? Odierno hasn't been very specific about what he intends to do after he takes command in Iraq next month, but he has indicated a broad consistency with the population-protection strategy of his predecessor, Gen. David Petraeus. But, as any counterinsurgent will tell you, population-protection strategies can't be pulled off when they're implemented from massive bases past the city limits and not... within the cities where the people are. Counterinsurgents deride that idea, associated with Petraeus's predecessor, Gen. George Casey -- now the Army chief of staff -- by calling that "commuting to work." So is Odierno going to have to be more like Casey than Petraeus?

Rice: Polish Missile Defense Has... Nothing To Do With Russia

Spencer Ackerman — Thu, 21 Aug 2008 21:24:51 GMT

Just because you're not tired of being lied to, here's Condoleezza Rice:

Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice and her Polish counterpart agreed to place 10 missile defense interceptors in Poland to defend against threats from Iran and North Korea, not to weaken Russia, the secretary said.

"This is an agreement that, of course, will establish a missile defense site here in Poland, a missile defense site that will help us to deal with the new threat to the 21st century of long-range missile threats from countries like Iran or from North Korea," Rice said yesterday at the Polish presidential palace in Warsaw.

Just just just just stop right there. That stillness you hear is your natural tranquility returning to you. Breathe deeply, exhaling the lie. Tell yourself, as a calming mechanism, North Korean missiles cannot hit Poland; even if they someday could, they never never would; and Iranian antipathy to the Poles does not exist. It's kind of amazing that Rice expects you to believe this. You will miss her when she's gone, and you promise to visit her in the Hague.

Time Running Out On The Sons Of Iraq?

Spencer Ackerman — Thu, 21 Aug 2008 16:18:51 GMT

Via Cernig, McClatchy has a disturbing report about an Iraq issue far more sub rosa than the withdrawal deal. The Shiite government's reluctance to incorporate thousands of former Sunni insurgents -- those Sons of Iraq again! -- is showing more and more signs of becoming a permanent condition. A senior Army commander tells McClatchy's Leila Fadel that it might tell all militiamen who don't have civilian jobs or security-force positions that they will either disarm by November 1 or be subject to arrest.

"We cannot stand them, and we detained many of them recently," said one senior Iraqi commander in Baghdad, who spoke only on the condition of anonymity because he wasn't authorized to discuss the issue. "Many of them were part of al Qaida despite the fact that many of them are helping us to fight al Qaida."

Longtime readers know I've had mixed-to-skeptical feelings about the Sons of Iraq for a long time. It's impossible to blame any U.S. commander who offered insurgents money and other inducements so their troops wouldn't get shot at. And the impulse to expand the program -- it ballooned to over 100,000 militiamen in scarcely a year -- was also a sensible and creative way to try to fracture the insurgency and extirpate the so-called "irreconcilables" who remained. The trouble was that Iraq isn't a vacuum. No government can stand the idea of not having a monopoly of force, and the sectarian characteristic of the Sons of Iraq -- mostly Sunnis, in contrast to a Shiite-led government and security structure -- was bound to make the Maliki government nervous. You just can't erase the legacy of sectarianism overnight. The incorporation of 100,000 Sunni men with guns, at the behest of the U.S., into the Army and police and civilian infrastructure looks to a Shiite government like a strategy for infiltration and, ultimately, a coup.

There's one other aspect of this that should be remarked upon. And that's this idea of Prime Minister Maliki's new assertiveness. Maliki looks more and more like he's actually trying to run the table, power-wise: forcing the Bush administration to agree to a timetable; going after his Sadrist rivals; going after the Sunni power structure in Diyala; etc. It would stand to reason that stiffing the Sons of Iraq is consistent with that strategy. He looks strong now, he figures, so why compromise? It's a very Bush-like style, so no wonder George W. Bush is so comfortable with him. But if it turns out he's not as strong as he thinks he is, he's in for a painful reconciliation with reality.

Rice: Deal Is Coming Soon, With Timetables

Spencer Ackerman — Thu, 21 Aug 2008 15:37:51 GMT

Looks like the Journal was right. Here's Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice, quoted by the AP (via TPM):

"We have agreed that some goals, some aspirational timetables for how that might unfold, are well worth having in such an agreement."

So "aspirational timetables" is the new euphemism for setting a date. Ball's in your court, John McCain.

A Timetable For Withdrawal From Iraq On The Way?

Spencer Ackerman — Thu, 21 Aug 2008 12:56:37 GMT

After years of telling the country that setting a date for withdrawal from Iraq would lead to total disaster -- "I believe setting a deadline for withdrawal would demoralize the Iraqi people, would encourage killers across the broader Middle East, and send a signal that America will not keep its commitment," said George W. Bush on May 1, 2007 -- an out-of-options Bush may be about to capitulate to a 2011 withdrawal of combat troops, according to the Wall Street Journal.

U.S. and Iraqi negotiators reached agreement on a security deal that calls for American military forces to leave Iraq's cities by next summer as a prelude to a full withdrawal of combat troops from the country, according to senior American officials.

The draft agreement sets 2011 as the goal date by which U.S. combat troops will leave Iraq, according to Iraqi Deputy Foreign Minister Mohammed al-Haj Humood and other people familiar with the matter. In the meantime, American troops will be leaving cities, towns and other population centers by the summer of 2009, living in bases outside of those areas, according to the draft.

It's possible that this report is wrong: The New York Times is reporting Humood said the deal doesn't have timetables in it, which is confusing to say the least. But if the Journal is right, so much for "demoraliz[ing]" the Iraqi people. That plan is right out of the Center for American Progress' "Strategic Redeployment" paper of 2005 -- get out of the cities, get less visible, move from a combat mission to a training mission, and then go. The left won the Iraq debate. Period.

The question, if the Journal is right, becomes whether John McCain remains the outlier from a consensus on withdrawal. His position is untenable: either he sticks with what he told the Veterans of Foreign Wars earlier this week -- "The great difference — the great difference [with Obama] — is that I intend to win" in Iraq -- and rejects the negotiated timeline; or, like Bush, he suddenly embraces what he's always said would be a disaster, thereby conceding that Obama was right all along.

There's a third possibility, of course. Bush could attempt to claim credit for ending the war ahead of the GOP convention -- the night McCain speaks is themed "peace" -- but Bush has already gone so far as recently as two months ago to reject even the concept of timelines, even as he's capitulating to them, as to make this a blatant absurdity. McCain would be laughed at if he tried to split that hair as well.

But we'll see what emerges from Iraq. Condoleezza Rice is in Baghdad this morning, and she's "dismiss[ing]... reports" that the deal is about to be done: "If I were you, I would disregard reports and rumors, anonymous statements about where this is." And true enough: the Times reports that Rice doesn't expect a final deal to emerge while she's in Iraq. Surely the Bush and McCain political staffs are figuring out what language is both consistent with their years of pronouncements on Iraq and salable to the American public before announcing a deal.

Rushing to Judgment on Russia

Charles A. Kupchan — Wed, 20 Aug 2008 22:50:26 GMT

Russia has unquestionably responded with disproportionate force to Georgia’s attack on the breakaway region of South Ossetia. Moscow not only expelled Georgian troops from the contested region, it sent overwhelming military force into Georgia proper -- effectively subjugating the country in a matter of days.

Washington's condemnation of the Russian invasion is certainly warranted, but the Bush administration’s response has gone from appropriately firm to rashly confrontational. Defense Sec. Robert Gates said, “there is a real concern that Russia has turned the corner here and is headed back toward its past.” Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice has proclaimed “in tatters” the hope that Russia had become a “responsible state, ready to integrate into international institutions.” The administration, backed by a chorus of pundits comparing Moscow’s actions to Soviet aggression during the Cold War, has jumped to the conclusion that the Russian bear is back.

But with the West in need of Russia’s cooperation on many different fronts –- energy, Iran’s nuclear program, the fight against Islamic extremism, to name a few -– Washington had better think twice before pronouncing a fundamental break with Moscow.

It could come to that. Should Russia keep its troops in Georgia and seek to turn the country into a satellite, then Washington may indeed be headed toward another era of militarized rivalry between Russia and the West. But we are not there yet. In the meantime, rushing to judgment and pronouncing a return of the Cold War risks becoming a self-fulfilling prophecy.

Contrary to the dominant narrative of the conflict in the United States, Russian action does not constitute a naked act of aggression. Responsibility for the war falls heavily on the shoulders of both Georgia and Russia. The two parties have been baiting each other for years. Ever since South Ossetia and Abkhazia, a second contested region, broke away from Georgia in the early 1990s, these “frozen conflicts” have been a crisis waiting to happen.

Georgia, not Russia, initiated the clash. Georgian President Mikheil Saakashvili sent his forces into South Ossetia on Aug. 7. Russia then capitalized on Georgia’s move, responding in kind. To be sure, the scope of Russia’s invasion soon became inordinate. But it is disingenuous to argue, as Robert Kagan does, that “the details of who did what to precipitate Russia's war against Georgia are not very important.” On the contrary, that Tbilisi first threw down the gauntlet makes a world of difference in assessing Russian intentions.

The U.S. narrative of the war portrays the conflict as a battle between an autocratic Goliath and a democratic David. The conflict is surely a mismatch -- precisely why Georgian troops readily retreated. And Georgia is indeed further down the path of democratization than Russia.

But Saakashvili is no knight in shining armor. He has amassed excessive power and been irresponsible in his embrace of a blustery nationalism. When confronted with political demonstrations last November, he seized emergency powers, broke up the protests with tear gas and fire hoses and shut down the opposition’s main TV station. Freedom House, an independent think tank, ranks Georgia as “partly free” -- the same ranking as Kuwait, Nigeria and Venezuela. Georgia does not deserve the free ride it is getting in the United States.

Russia has indeed tightened its hold on South Ossetia and Abkhazia. It remains to be seen whether Moscow enters good-faith negotiations over their future status. But at least for now, Russia’s drive into Georgia proper appears to be aimed at creating a buffer zone around the two contested regions, not occupying or annexing territory in Georgia proper.

Russia has not sought to topple the government in Tbilisi. Nor has it seized or destroyed oil and gas pipelines, undercutting claims that one of Moscow’s main objectives in Georgia is to wrest control of the flow of Caspian oil and gas. Time will tell, but Russia’s war aims have thus far been limited -- they are not in line with pronouncements that Russia is again an imperial aggressor bent on territorial expansion.

The Bush administration is right to express grave concern about Russian behavior in Georgia, but why has it rushed to the conclusion that a new Cold War is right around the corner?

Part of the problem is a Cold War hangover. Vice President Dick Cheney, Gates, Rice – all are ex-Cold Warriors. For them, attributing imperial intent to Russian behavior, and envisaging a world divided by East-West conflict, comes all too easily. The Cold War template was waiting on the shelf -- it just needed dusting off.

The closeness of Georgia’s relations with the United States has also contributed to the elevated rhetoric. Saakashvili not only ingratiated himself with President George W. Bush and his top advisers, he built a broad network of supporters on both sides of the aisle. Moreover, Georgia has been a loyal partner of Washington -- sending 2,000 troops to Iraq and staunchly supporting Bush’s freedom agenda. Hence, the chorus of voices that has come to Georgia’s defense and put exclusive blame for the conflict on Russia’s doorstep.

Finally, the neo-conservatives are again exercising outsized influence over U.S. policy and public debate. Long arguing that autocracies like Russia had to be contained, the neo-conservatives are seizing on this to advance their own agenda. In an election season in which foreign policy looms large, it can be treacherous to push back against the hard-liners. In this respect, Russia is playing right into the neo-conservative game plan.

The conflict in Georgia is far from over. Russian behavior should be condemned and threats of isolation maintained until Moscow withdraws its troops and heads to the negotiating table. Washington and its allies in Europe must remain on guard against the possibility that Russia has indeed returned to an imperial path.

But trumped-up talk of a newly divided Europe is both premature and dangerous. The West needs Russian cooperation on many fronts, and so has to have a strong reason to isolate Russia and, again, to man the barricades. Russia may provide this reason.

But the jury is still out in Georgia.

Charles A. Kupchan is professor of international affairs at Georgetown University and senior fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations.

Pentagon Finally Prioritizing Afghanistan?

Spencer Ackerman — Wed, 20 Aug 2008 17:00:00 GMT

That's what U.S. News suggests. Gen. David McKiernan, commander of NATO forces in the increasingly chaotic war, tells the magazine's Anna Mulrine that he's getting as many as 15,000 additional troops as early as the end of the year. (That sound early to you? Considering the rapid deterioration over the past year?) McKiernan wants even more than that, though, but there's one small problem:

Finding those particular troops to supplement the 101st, however, depends on conditions and troop levels in Iraq, adds McKiernan, who took over the NATO command in June. "That's really a zero-sum decision."

Yes, indeed, it is. And if ever there's a case where your judgment about prolonging or ending the war is implicated -- as well as your perspective on whether the war was ever in the U.S.'s interest -- here it is. You can't put the troops in Afghanistan if they're in Iraq.

McKiernan's comments are probably aimed at his next boss: a certain fellow named Gen. David H. Petraeus, you may have heard of him. Before Petraeus heads to Florida to take over U.S. Central Command, he'll be testifying before Congress next month about the situation in Iraq. Now that Petraeus will have to take a focus broader than Iraq, McKiernan surely wants to make sure his boss knows about the opportunity costs that the Iraq occupation imposes upon Afghanistan. Don't expect Petraeus to become Fox Fallon just yet, but pay attention to what Petraeus tells Congress.

Maliki's 'Assertiveness' Against The Sunnis

Spencer Ackerman — Wed, 20 Aug 2008 14:40:00 GMT

Via Cernig, the son of Adnan Dulaimi, head of the Sunni Accordance Front, has just been arrested by Maliki's forces. Reuters:

"I asked them why they are taking him. They said they are preparing charges of terrorism, sectarian killings and displacing people," he told Reuters by telephone.

"My son is a humble man. He does not deal with political things. He only owns a shop selling spare car parts."

Another son of Dulaimi's has been held since last year along with many of the politician's bodyguards who were accused of links to a car bomb ring. Dulaimi has always denied the charges, which were a significant source of sectarian friction.

One possibility is Dulaimi's son is a terrorist and Maliki's dudes are acting in accordance with the law. Another possibility is that this is an example of the "assertiveness" that everyone's praising Maliki with possessing these days. He's figuring -- pace John Nagl, Shawn Brimley & Colin Kahl -- that he can run the table on political opposition, whether this means Sadr, the upstart Sunni Awakening groups and the rest of what's being called the Powers That Aren't or the current Sunni quasi-Powers That Be. It can take the form of trying to elect Barack Obama and simultaneously undercutting the Sadrists or it can take the form of turning the Diyala security operation into a crackdown on the Sunni power structure.

The Return of 'Catastrophic Success'

Spencer Ackerman — Tue, 19 Aug 2008 20:33:57 GMT

I just got off a conference call with Brig. Gen. Robert Holmes, a deputy director for operations at U.S. Central Command, which directs U.S. military operations in most of the Middle East and South Asia. Naturally, the call centered around yesterday's spectacular Taliban attacks in Afghanistan, in which company-sized Taliban forces assaulted a French outpost while another detachment went after U.S. troops. The confident Holmes brought back the specter of an old term from the Iraq war: "Catastrophic Success."

So I asked Holmes what the attacks signified. "This threat has been there all along," he said, suggesting that the Taliban might have "gotten a little bolder" and taken advantage of the arrival of new, unprepared French forces into the area. "Does it mean we've mis-gaged the situation in Afghanistan? I don't think so. My take is the Taliban have not went away. It's not so much a resurgence as response -- that we recognize we're presenting more force there... As we present a greater sustained force there, the Taliban come out to fight," perhaps assisted by Al Qaeda. "Did we miscue? Not necessarily."

Holmes' answer didn't strike many other bloggers on the call as convincing. Andrew Lubin and Military.com's Christian Lowe (who showed himself to be a rather tenacious reporter) pressed Holmes to explain how increased Taliban massed attacks didn't indicate a strengthened enemy. Holmes said it was to be expected: "They're fighting in more organized TTP [tactics, techniques and procedures] than we would have seen six years ago, when we fouht bands of irregular fighters. We've seen TTP changes so they're fighting more in company-sized elements... I'm not saying necessarily that they're more effective. A lot of their TTP remains the same... it's not to say they're growing stronger." The Taliban's attacks aren't necessarily "achieving great military effect," he said. "What we see is that they use the attacks for great [information operations], great strategic communications value. I don't deny that. That's part of the asymmetric fight."

The idea that an insurgency is only attacking us because a) we're pressing them harder and b) they're looking to get a good headline is nothing new. In 2004, as part of a general state of denial, President Bush said much the same thing about the situation in Iraq, using the term "catastrophic success." In other words, all the increased casualties and increased chaos proved was that we were winning -- why else would the insurgency feel such an urgent need to attack us? It would take Bush several years and over 2000 more U.S. troop deaths to admit that this was an obvious absurdity. Clearly, however, the absurdity lives on, several thousand miles to the east.

For more on yesterday's attacks, see RockRichard at VetVoice:

When will the powers that be recognize that we need to stop chasing the easter bunny in Iraq before the Taliban and Al Qaeda over run our bases in Afghanistan? Hopefully, a moment of clarity will come soon and several thousand additional boots can be on the ground before the next Taliban attack is more successful than this one.

And also VetVoice's Brandon Friedman for a broader overview:

The war in Iraq--at its most violent peak--was never as dangerous for our troops as Afghanistan now is. In the past 10 weeks, three American soldiers have been captured, killed, and chopped up. Nine American soldiers were killed in a single instance when their outpost was overrun by Taliban militants. And today, the violence only intensified: 10 French soldiers were slaughtered in an ambush, with four of them being captured and subsequently executed. Around the same time, Afghan insurgents launched a coordinated attack on a major U.S. base.

The fatality rate in Afghanistan during the past 10 weeks would be equivalent to 353 deaths in Iraq at the same time--a rate not even seen during the bloody crescendo of 2007.

This is a crisis.

Crisis In Kirkuk

Spencer Ackerman — Tue, 19 Aug 2008 19:15:00 GMT

To expand on a point I raised in my just-published piece about the legacy of Sergio Vieira de Mello: today The New York Times takes a look at how desperate the situation is in Kirkuk, an oil-rich Iraqi city claimed by Arabs, Kurds and Turkmen, all of whom are already battling for control. After importing tens of thousands of Kurds into Kirkuk to ensure victory in a much-delayed referendum about whether Baghdad or the Kurdish capital, Erbil, will control Kirkuk, the Kurds have also brought a fearsome goon squad called the Asaish to keep the Turkmen and the Arabs in line. The Kurds claim that the Asaish is backed by U.S. intelligence, according to the Times.

This is what passes for political discourse in Kirkuk:

It took only a few moments for the demonstrators to turn their fury on the Turkmens, whom they instantly blamed. One mistook a well-known Kurdish journalist, Yahya Barzanji, for a Turkmen correspondent, shouting, “He’s working for the Turkmens,” Mr. Barzanji recalled. A video captured the crowd furiously beating Mr. Barzanji, chanting: “Kill him! Kill him!”

Note how starkly the senior U.S. military commander in the city described the city's tensions:

Colonel Paschal blames all the political parties for inflaming tensions to serve their interests. But he said it was difficult to comprehend the level of mistrust.

“Negotiations here are, ‘You give me everything I want, and I will walk away happy,’ ” he said. “It is hard for us to appreciate the level of ethnic hatred.”

Every time you hear someone denigrate the United Nations, remember that the only reason Kirkuk hasn't descended into full-scale bloodletting is because the U.N. was able to persuade all sides not to go forward with the referendum, figuring that any qualitative change in the city's ownership ahead of a cross-sectarian accord would mean total disaster. No one but the U.N. possessed the credibility to broker that deferral. And it may not yet hold.

Iraqi Refugees On PBS

Spencer Ackerman — Tue, 19 Aug 2008 18:15:00 GMT

Here's a nice coda to my piece last week on Iraqi refugees: tonight on PBS's "Wide Angle" program, Aaron Brown takes a look at the refugee crisis in Jordan and Syria. The Los Angeles Times previews:

It is a "refugee crisis without refugee camps," which makes it largely invisible to the outside world. The individual stories are heart-wrenching.

"They blew up my house and I ran away," says one man who served as a translator for the U.S. Army.

Some women and girls turn to prostitution for survival, turning tricks for militia fighters on leave from Baghdad. Only one in five children from refugee families is in school, Brown reports.

Worth taking some time out from the Olympics.

The Legacy of a Modern Diplomat

Spencer Ackerman — Tue, 19 Aug 2008 17:25:19 GMT

Five years ago today, a massive truck bomb detonated at the U.N. compound in Baghdad, killing 23 people. Among them was Sergio Vieira de Mello, the U.N.'s special representative in Iraq, and a legendary Brazilian diplomat who represented a sea change in the U.N.'s reactions to humanitarian emergencies.

Viera de Mello's decades of working for and with the United Nations included deep experience with seemingly intractable conflict and reconstruction missions in Cambodia, Kosovo and East Timor. Dynamic, suave and empathetic, Vieira deMello was widely eulogized as a singular figure in international diplomacy. "I had only one Sergio," said a shaken Kofi Annan, then the U.N. secretary general, in the bombing's aftermath.

Vieira de Mello's biographer, the human-rights expert and former Barack Obama adviser Samantha Power, agrees. "Whether on Darfur or on Georgia," Power wrote in an email sent from Brazil, where she is commemorating the diplomat's life, "one doesn't feel today as if there is an international official (unaffiliated with his country's national agenda) who can be relied upon to be sent into a crisis, suss the scene and, while not a miracle worker, max out on what can be achieved -- through negotiations, through the mobilization of international resources (Sergio was a hell of a salesman once he got back to capitols), etc."

Vieira de Mello still looms large five years after his death -- and his legacy is a new breed of U.N. diplomat. "Up until the early 1990s, the U.N. was mostly a diplomatic forum," explained James Traub, a writer for the New York Times magazine and author of "The Best Intentions: Kofi Annan and the U.N. in the Era of American World Power." "When it engaged in big nation-building and peace-keeping actions, a whole new generation arose who had real-world experience in unbelievably trying settings, involving deep and difficult issues of sovereignty."

Vieira de Mello represented a transformation toward a more activist U.N. diplomat -- one more comfortable settling disputes and tending to humanitarian crises in combat zones than smoothing over hurt feelings at U.N. headquarters in New York. "He never got muddy, despite wading in the mud so frequently," said Traub, meaning that both literally and figuratively.

While Vieira de Mello might have been the best of that trail-blazing generation, he most certainly is not the last. Among the places that generation is proving its mettle is, ironically, the country where Vieira gave his life: Iraq. Right now, the Swedish diplomat Steffan de Mistura has thrown himself into the thick of Iraq's toughest problems.

When a humanitarian crisis erupted in the second half of the 20th century, Vieira de Mello was often there, largely as a troubleshooter with the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees, and then rising to become U.N. High Commissioner for Human Rights in 2002. Born in Brazil in 1948 -- two years after the birth of the U.N. itself -- into a family of diplomats, the Sorbonne-educated Vieira de Mello saw earlier than most that the superpower competition between the United States and the Soviet Union created conditions where no one power had an interest in resolving or alleviating humanitarian-related catastrophes.

Beginning in 1969, he stepped into that vacuum, first in Bangladesh, during the bloody 1971 war of separation from Pakistan; then into practically every third-world conflict zone. His resume of service is a checklist of late-20th-century horrors: Cyprus in 1974-5; Lebanon during the bloodiest phase of the civil war and Israeli occupation; Cambodia in the early 90s, working on mine retrieval and repatriation; the Balkan wars; viceroy of East Timor during the 1999-2002 transition to independence from Indonesia; Iraq.

Ironically, Vieira de Mello viscerally shared a criticism of the U.N. often levied by its most ardent American critics: its penchant for inactivity. While he never shared their prescription of weakening the U.N., he pushed the international organization throughout his career to take a broader activist role in resolving both global conflicts and internal disputes -- what Traub called making the U.N. the "arbiter of sovereignty."

In the aftermath of the Cold War, first Secretary General Boutros Boutros-Ghali and then Annan began spelling out a doctrine of U.N. intervention in cases of extreme human-rights emergency. "The time of absolute sovereignty," Boutros-Ghali proclaimed in 1992, had "passed." Yet throughout the 1990s, the world groped to define what that meant -- with inaction during the Rwandan genocide, and delayed reaction to the genocide in the Balkans.

The inaction that U.N. critics frequently cite as endemic was also a problem for the frantic diplomat. After Annan instructed Vieira de Mello to take an administrative post in New York in 1997, one colleague told him, "There is the U.N. that meets, and the U.N. that does. Now you are joining the U.N. that meets," according to Power's biography, "Chasing The Flame." Vieira de Mello's special assistant, Fabrizio Hochschild, explained to Power, "Sergio had endless patience for everything else -- but no patience for administration."

Yet Vieira de Mello had an asset perhaps unique among diplomats. "Sergio was also the only international official who was trusted by all five of the permanent members of the Security Council," said Power, referring to the United States, Britain, China, France and Russia, each of whom can veto actions proposed by the U.N.'s decision-making body. "Council unity proves to be a crucial ingredient to the 'international community' actually getting what 'it' wants. And that unity has never been more lacking. The go-to guy was gone."

In late 1999, the U.N. brokered a referendum on independence on East Timor, which Indonesia had occupied since 1975. The vote went precisely as expected: East Timor voted for independence; Indonesia reacted to the vote by sponsoring marauding bands of militias; the great powers were reluctant to intervene, and a reluctant U.N. found itself pressed to act.

The Security Council authorized an Australian-led peace-keeping force, and Annan asked Vieira de Mello to act as the U.N. representative, with a mandate to somehow broker peace. Soon, the diplomat found himself in intense negotiations with Xanana Gusmao, the similarly charismatic East Timorese leader, who came from a very different social strata than Vieirade Mello.

Traub, working as a reporter in East Timor at the time, saw Vieira de Mello's talents up close. "He let me sit on his meeting" with Gusmao, Traub remembered. "There was obvious warmth, friendliness and charm between Sergio -- this Paris-educated, charming, elegant guy -- and this guy [Gusmao] who had been living in jungles for years, and imprisoned for years. The bond between them was so clear, just from the body language, that [Vieira de Mello] had earned his trust. It just showed you the enormous importance of the human element in diplomacy."

Vieira de Mello was personally opposed to the Iraq war. Yet he felt duty-bound to head the U.N.'s mission there, to help restore the credibility of the international body after the Bush administration circumvented it to invade. According to Power, Annan deployed him to Iraq because the secretary general believed that Vieira de Mello posed the greatest chance of any U.N. functionary of influencing President George W. Bush, whom Vieira de Mello had somehow charmed, even while criticizing the president.

The post was supposed to be brief. "It was only for four months," remembered Scott Malcomson, a senior adviser to Vieira de Mello who is now an editor at The New York Times Magazine. "To the degree I can be certain of anything, he was going to stick to that."

Yet his time in Iraq was chiefly defined by two facts: lack of cooperation with the U.S. governing entity known as the Coalition Provisional Authority and intense action among political figures that the Bush administration had attempted to marginalize. "He focused on broadening the Iraqi political process as much as possible," Malcomson said. "He went to all the capitols of all the surrounding countries and spoke at the highest level he could reach, and in Iraq he did much the same."

Unlike the Bush administration, Vieira de Mello engaged the existing sources of power in Iraq, including the Shiite religious leader Ali al-Sistani. Sistani's opposition to the U.S. plan to write a constitution under occupation brought hundreds of thousands of demonstrators to the streets until the Coalition Provisional Authority agreed to his demand to hold elections first.

In an interview last month, Dave Kilcullen, a former adviser to Gen. David Petraeus and architect of the 2007 counterinsurgency strategy that helped reduced violence in Iraq, inadvertently vindicated Vieira de Mello's approach. "We'd walk in and say 'we're in charge,' Kilcullen said. "In 2007 that stopped. We said, 'You guys are in charge.' You know, 'Take me to your leaders.' ... We treated the landscape as we found it."

As Malcomson put it, "He was trying to extend the political process in Iraq and out of Iraq -- with the idea that that would lead to the earliest possible end of the occupation. Because the occupation would become less necessary."

From 2004 to 2007, in the post-Vieira de Mello era, the U.N. Advisory Mission in Iraq, known as UNAMI, receded significantly. Its offices moved out of Baghdad and into the safety of neighboring Amman. Yet over the past few years -- even before the violence receded in 2007 -- UNAMI's presence has ramped up. Its diplomats, under the leadership first of Pakistan's Ashraf Jehangir Qazi and now Sweden's Staffan de Mistura, have taken up Vieira de Mello's banner, negotiating intensely behind the scenes to resolve some of Iraq's thorniest issues. (De Mistura, Power said, was a "great friend" of Vieirade Mello.)

Among these issues is Kirkuk, the oil-rich multi-ethnic city in northern Iraqi, claimed by both the Kurds and the Arabs. For years, the Kurds -- who call the city their "Jerusalem" -- have sworn to incorporate Kirkuk within their autonomous region, fueling Arab fears that this would prelude secession.

In 2004-05, the Kurds succeeded in pushing through a constitutional provision guaranteeing a referendum on the city's status -- secure in the knowledge that their importation of Kurds into the city guarantees victory at the polls. That vote, constitutionally scheduled for late 2007, has been repeatedly deferred at the behest of the U.N., which fears that a vote ahead of a sectarian compact could reap a new crest of violence. So far, the U.N. -- being untainted by the occupation -- is the only credible interlocutor recognized by all parties to broker a fair solution, if one is possible.

Whatever success the U.N. may or may not be able to claim in resolving the Kirkuk dilemma, and however Vieira de Mello's career has inspired his successors, his absence is felt keenly on the world stage. "Fourteen war zones, six languages, an ability to move between Washington cocktail parties and life under siege," Power explained, citing Viera de Mello's unique talents and experiences. "An ability to bring the political-strategic insights of a statesman with the gritty field sensibility of a person who had spent most of his career working hands-on in violent places. When Annan said, 'I only have one Sergio,' after Sergio died -- he was right."

The website for Power's biography of Vieira de Mello will host a variety of remembrances on Tuesday. "Dialogue was always his solution, and it was based on a very simple concept: every human being deserves respect and dignity," wrote Annick Stevenson, a former speechwriter for Vieira de Mello. "A world like Sergio’s can exist. We just have to remember his example, and to think about how he would react in any given circumstance."

Musharraf Heads to... New Mexico?

Spencer Ackerman — Tue, 19 Aug 2008 15:08:01 GMT

Over at our New Mexico affiliate, David Alire Garcia has a weeeeeeeird catch. Apparently Pervez Musharraf, fresh from ignominy-filled resignation in Pakistan, is checking out the sunnier climes of New Mexico.

According to Shuja Nawaz, a former Pakistani journalist and International Development Agency official, that’s precisely the plan.

“He's likely... to leave the country and that a possible immediate destination may be Dubai, and then eventually may be New Mexico in the United States,” Nawaz told Margret Warner of PBS’ Newshour, also on Monday.” But this is unconfirmed,” he added.

Warner immediately interjected “New Mexico?” somewhat incredulously, but quickly moved on to other subjects surrounding Musharraf’s exit.

Musharraf is friends with Bill Richardson, right?

Maybe You Want To Focus On Afghanistan Now?

Spencer Ackerman — Tue, 19 Aug 2008 14:31:45 GMT

With U.S. troops bogged down in Iraq, the Taliban just mounted an extremely brazen attack in Afghanistan. The New York Times:

Taliban insurgents mounted their most serious attacks in six years of fighting, one a complex attack with multiple suicide bombers on a United States military base Monday night, and another by some 100 insurgents on French forces in a district east of the capital, killing 10 French soldiers and wounding 21 others, military officials said Tuesday.

Three American soldiers were wounded and six members of the Afghan special forces in the attack on the base in the eastern province of Khost, bordering Pakistan, the Afghan military spokesman, General Zaher Azimi, said. The battle lasted all night, 10 suicide bombers were killed or blew themselves up, and the insurgents were repulsed without entering the base, he said.

That's some Viet Cong-type stuff right there. One hundred insurgents massed an attack? You'd think that the Taliban wouldn't want to attack in mass, since it would presumably open them up to artillery and air assault. But apparently they don't fear a sufficient U.S. or NATO retaliation. That attack, the Times reports, is believed to have been connected to the machinations of old-school guerrilla leader Gulbuddin Hekmatyar who -- surprise! -- is believed to be in Pakistan. Not like you'd want to recognize that AfghaniPakistan is the central front of the war on terror or anything.

Seriously, these were pitched battles that lasted all night, the sort of thing that was practically unheard of two years ago. And the Pentagon still doesn't treat Afghanistan like an emergency.

Does McCain Really Want to Make Foreign Policy Judgment The Central Theme Of His Candidacy?

Spencer Ackerman — Mon, 18 Aug 2008 21:30:00 GMT

All signs point to yes, but his Veterans of Foreign Wars speech today is basically him walking into a trap. F'rinstance:

Thanks to the courage and sacrifice of our soldiers, sailors, airmen, and Marines and to brave Iraqi fighters the surge has succeeded. And yet Senator Obama still cannot quite bring himself to admit his own failure in judgment. Nor has he been willing to heed the guidance of General Petraeus, or to listen to our troops on the ground when they say -- as they have said to me on my trips to Iraq: "Let us win, just let us win." Instead, Senator Obama commits the greater error of insisting that even in hindsight, he would oppose the surge. Even in retrospect, he would choose the path of retreat and failure for America over the path of success and victory. In short, both candidates in this election pledge to end this war and bring our troops home. The great difference is that I intend to win it first.

But the failure in judgment is in invading and occupying Iraq. The idea that the proper response to a hellish war is to stay until it's less-hellish is not worthy of a serious presidential candidate. Obama can make mincemeat out of this by simply pointing to this other war, and the deterioration of this other country, that happen to be, like, you know, where al-Qaeda actually is. (Oh and for good measure, McCain has no intention of actually bringing the troops home from Iraq, nor does he have any idea how to win in Iraq, nor even what winning means.)

Rice Grateful for Musharraf

Spencer Ackerman — Mon, 18 Aug 2008 19:00:00 GMT

I suppose Condoleezza Rice sort of had to say this --

“President Musharraf made the critical choice to join the fight against al-Qaida, the Taliban, and other extremist groups that threaten the peace and security of Pakistan, its neighbors, and partners throughout the world,” Rice said in a statement. “For this, he has our deep gratitude.”

-- but but but. Shouldn't her emphasis have been more on the boundless energy of the Pakistani people and the promise of a return to civilian democracy and all the other platitudes that foreign ministers issue when a hated leader shuffles off in ignominy? Is it really necessary to praise Musharraf on his way out when Pakistan absolutely hates him, and managed to push him aside without the sort of coup that he used to gain power? Just imagine if Rice and Bush had actually hewed to the blandishments of the hollow "Freedom Agenda" and actually supported the middle-class rebellion that arose after Musharraf deposed Chief Justice Iftikhar Chaudhry? Musharraf, after all, might have assassinated his chief political rival in December, let's not forget.

I guess it's good manners. Musharraf was a great ally to Bush, if not to the American people. In 2004, on the very day that John Kerry accepted the Democratic nomination, Pakistan announced the capture of an important al-Qaeda terrorist, Ahmed Khalfan Ghailani, three weeks after two colleagues and I reported that Bush aides asked Pakistani intelligence officials to do so. So Condoleeza Rice really does have a lot to be grateful for.

No Oil Deals for Iraq?

Spencer Ackerman — Mon, 18 Aug 2008 16:50:00 GMT

Whoa. Via Juan Cole, here's something I never expected to read:

The Iraqi government is likely to abandon plans to sign short-term contracts with foreign oil companies, negotiations over which have been halting, a senior U.S. diplomat in Baghdad said on Sunday.

"It appears that on present form (the Iraqi government) probably won't proceed with most of these or all of them," Charles Ries, coordinator for Iraq's economic transition at the U.S. embassy in Baghdad, told reporters.

"But I think that some of the companies are open to continued discussions even on relationship grounds, and some of the companies ... don't think it's worth their time."

Apparently the Maliki government, after opening up talks for no-bid contracts to the oil giants, is driving a hard bargain. It puts me in mind of a quote that Carnegie's Martha Brill Olcott gave me for this piece:

The oil conglomerates "are the toughest negotiators," said Martha Brill Olcott, a former Unocal adviser now at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. "They'll work out a contract that insulates themselves from political risk. That's where countries get upset -- they paid too great a price to protect Western companies from political risk. That's a problem: Iraqis might agree to one set of terms now, but you can imagine in 2015, if we're lucky and it's stable [in Iraq], then they'll say, 'Why the hell did we agree to these terms?'"

It looks like Maliki didn't want to wait until 2015.