'Like A Self-Licking Ice Cream Cone'
I just got off a conference call with Col. Jon Lehr, who commands one of the surge brigades in Iraq. Lehr's brigade, the 4th Stryker Brigade Combat Team of the 2nd Infantry Division, has operated in Baghdad and Diyala province for the last 14 months and is on the cusp of finally returning home to Ft. Lewis, Washington. To say I was impressed with Lehr is an understatement: he made some really insightful and candid points about the complexity of the war.
Diyala is home to a mix of Sunnis and Shiites, and areas like Baquba and Muqtadiyah have been hotbeds of insurgent and sectarian activity. Lehr said violence is down 70 percent from when his unit deployed there last year -- but there's a risk of becoming "victims of our own success":
The more successful we are against Al Qaeda, the more we open the door for Shia extremists. We have to watch... to [see that we don't] create conditions for Shia [extremists] to conduct operations against Sunnis who are clearing Al Qaeda out. It's really like a self-licking ice cream cone... If we're successful against Al Qaeda [that] invites Shia extremists in [and that] invites Sunni insurgents [back]. It's very complex.
One of the factors Lehr credits for his brigade's success is the Sons of Iraq militia program. But when I asked him about its potential to create the next generation of Iraqi warlords, he sounded another note of caution:
Not all Sons of Iraq are created equal. There are two distinct groups: one, mainly associated with the rural areas, are more tribal [inaudible]. In my opinion, they're easier to work with, and not tied to any political parties. The ones in the urban areas [like Baquba]... are more politically aligned. There are four major political groups in Baquba with [Sons of Iraq militias]: Saladin, the 1920s Revolution, the Mujahideen and Hamas of Iraq. They've confederated into, as I say, a confederate organization referred to as the People's Committee.
To get to the heart of your question, our approach remains targeting bad individuals [with] sources, other technical means, [to determine] who the bad people are -- the bad CLCs, the bad Sons of Iraq, [those] supporting crime or sectarian violence.
Lehr estimated that he's detained at least 60 renegade members of the Sons of Iraq, and perhaps as many as 100, out of a program numbering 9000 militiamen and scheduled to reduce down to 8000 in the coming months. "It's a self-cleansing process," he said. "We keep an eye on them, because many have former insurgent ties. Many more are very patriotic. [But they're] central to our strategy."
Comments:
Posted 05/23/2008 02:54pm with
Whoa, notice that interesting little tidbit buried in the Colonel’s comments?
It’s this one: “There are four major political groups in Baquba with [Sons of Iraq militias]: Saladin, the 1920s Revolution, the Mujahideen and Hamas of Iraq.”
HAMAS IN IRAQ???? Hello? Let’s see, Al Qaeda in Iraq is a dangerous terrorist group that is part of the larger evil, vicious, international terrorist group Al Qaeda, and…Hamas of Iraq is what? A Cub Scout troop? We’re funding HAMAS IN IRAQ?
If you ask me that’s the headline out of this story.
Posted 05/23/2008 07:03pm with
I’m sure he meant the Sunni Arab group “Hamas in Iraq” (sometimes translated as “Hamas of Iraq”), which fractured from the 1920s in 2007. They already had broken with AQI following a former working relationship in Ramadi.
Eventually, it gained enough 1920s refugees that it pretty much took over a large part of the franchise. Last month, leaders of Hamas in Iraq made headlines when they accused Iran of funding AQIZ, not various Sunni Arab rackets.
Their ultimate loyalty to the US is very much in doubt, but for the moment they are enamored with fighting AQIZ and Iran, parties which Hamas in Iraq leaders believe are one and the same.
Posted 05/23/2008 09:46pm with
I understand your point but my reference was more to the larger issue of conflating AQ in Iraq with bin Laden’s AQ, an absurdity since AQI wasn’t created until we invaded and not created by ABL, and using them as “proof” that we are “fighting terrorists” but completely ignoring the same apparent connection (which also may or may not be valid, that isn’t really the point though) between Hamas and Hamas of Iraq. The connection is convenient in terms of AQ so it is made but inconvenient in terms of Hamas so it is ignored.
Of course their loyalty is in doubt, everybody’s loyalty in Iraq is in doubt, even ours (in terms of loyalty to groups within Iraq).
Posted 05/24/2008 11:04am with
Actually, much of the seed corn that planted AQIZ in Iraq came from Ansar al-Islam, a mix of salafi Kurds and foreign fighters arriving in the no-man’s land between Kurdistan and Baathist Iraq in 2001-02, after the fall of Talibi Afghanistan.
It’s always bothered me when I hear that “al Qaeda wasn’t in Iraq until we got there,” because confederates of far-enemy al Qaeda sure were, and they were reconstituted as AQIZ under the leadership of Jordan’s al-Zarqawi in a rebranding experiment sponsored by formal, hierarchical, bin Laden al Qaeda.
Also, don’t put too much into “HAMAS” as if it is solely a reference to the HAMAS in Gaza. It’s an acronym (loosely, it means Islamic Resistance Movement) and it’s been used throughout the ME for 20 years by many groups, following its adoption during the first Intifadah to reflect the movement’s divergence from the Gazan wing of Egypt’s Muslim Brotherhood.
It’s use as a nickname for an insurgent group in Iraq played on the notion that it was adopting violence to evict an occupier (hey, that’s us!) and that it was willing to eventually become a political party.
Well, events change, right? It’s now both a militia temporarily allied to the US in a common fight against its real and perceived enemies (AQIZ and Iran) and a political party following in the “Awakening” mold.
The hard reality is that today Hamas of Iraq has quite different policy goals from Hamas in Gaza (including the receiving of funds and armaments from Iran), whereas AQIZ continues in its near enemy capacity to travel ideologically alongside the formal al Qaeda current in NW Pakistan.
At best, you’re left with an irony (Hamas in Iraq is allied to the US, but Hamas in Gaza is not).
I can live with irony, so long as the ironic don’t mind killing AQIZ.
Posted 05/25/2008 05:53pm with
And the further irony of that no-man’s land that fosterd the much touted terrorist camp in Iraq rhetoric used before the war is that it was under the Northern No-Fly zone, protected by US warplanes from attack by Saddam. The same No-Fly zone that also fostered the Kurdish revival in Northern Iraq along the Turkish border. So really, that AQ influence in Iraq would not have been there had Saddam been able to get at that camp and that group, but he couldn’t because we were unwittingly, or unintenionally, protecting them with our air cover. So really they do exist in Iraq because of us, not because of anything to do with the Iraqi government before we invaded.
But yeah, I hear you on the differences between groups, and I understand those differences though maybe not to the depth you do. However, my point was the ridiculous conflation by our adminstration for political purposes and how easily that can be used. A Hamas/Hamas connection would be easy to make if they wished but right not it is not politically useful, most Americans don’t know the difference and wouldn’t make the distinction and would thus buy into, with the same gullibility as the Saddam/9-11 connection (which still lingers).
Posted 06/04/2008 01:41pm with
Correct me if I’m wrong, but Hamas in Syria/Palestinian territories is Shiite, supported by Iran, and is fighting against the Sunni-controlled, US-supported gov’t in Lebanon; whereas the Hamas mentioned by COL Lehr is Sunni.
Are the two groups connected in any way other than they both chose the same name?
Also, it’s worth noting that there were several extensive terrorist training camps in Iraq, camps whose “students” fought US forces on the March to Baghdad. I had second-hand knowledge of them (I was in country but not in the 101st or 2 ACR). I’m puzzled why their existance and activities have never become part of the war’s narrative.
Posted 06/12/2008 01:52pm with
I find it funny that everyone was concentrating on Hamas of Iraq and ignored two of the other groups, the 1920’s Revolution and the Mujahideen. We were fighting all three of them as late as the end of 2007. There were several smaller Pro Iraq groups operating throughout 2007 which never got major recognition, which focused as much attention on killing foreign fighters as they did on attacking Coalition forces.
The 1920’s Revolutionary Brigade (1920RB) had a major split in mid/late 2007, which eventually lead to the formation of the 1920’s Revolution and HAMAS of Iraq.
Several of the larger groups in Iraq have been distancing themselves from AQI over the last year. The one I have the most experience with is Ansar al-Sunna, which went from launching several of the bloodiest attacks in Iraq in 2004 to being very selective in their attacks so that they only target Coalition forces, GOI, and Shiite militias (specifically ‘Death Squads’, which they have launched several large scale operations against). I always found it interesting that a Sunni group would go through so much trouble to avoid killing Shiite non-combatants. They often release warnings telling all citizens to avoid certain areas where they will be launching a series of operations.